Advanced persistent distributed denial-of-service (APDDoS) attack is a serious threat to the computer network's security. This paper proposes a new APDDoS model integrated with a reverse-path forwarding based defensive strategy. The attacked threshold of the attached model is calculated and the model's stability under different conditions is analytically analyzed. The impact of different parameter values on the system's behaviors is investigated and practical strategies to mitigate the APDDoS attack are recommended.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet applications, cyber-attacks have become one of the most critical threats to modern information systems. Typical cyber-attacks include, among the others, targeted attacks, SQL injections, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks and account hijacking [1] . DDoS attacks are preferred by hackers due to their characteristics of being of low attack cost, difficult to defend, and good for the concealment of the attacker [2] .
In a denial-of-service attack (DoS attack), the hacker attempts to block one or more servers in a computer network from providing services to their legal users. When attack traffic is performed by means of different sources, such as a DoS attack, it is usually known as a Distributed Denialof-Service (DDoS) attack [3] , [4] . Among these, Advanced Persistent DDoS (APDDoS) attacks are referred to DDoS attacks that have clear targets, mighty computing power, and take place over extended periods [5] , [6] .
APDDoS attacks are recognized as one of the most severe threats to the computer network's security and have caused a series of cybersecurity incidents. Examples of such attacks include: five Russian banks were attacked by APDDoS
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Wen Chen . attacks in January 2016 with one of these attacks lasting for approximately 12 hours [7] ; the Ukrainian postal system was subjected to a two-day APDDoS attack in 2017 that severely interrupted the system's operation [8] ; the official website of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics Organizing Committee was forced to shut down during the Winter Olympic Games on 9 February 2018 due to an APDDoS attack [9] ; Github suffered an APDDoS attack in March 2018 in which the maximum peak traffic reached 1.7 TBPS [10] .
These real-world incidents highlight the significance of studying the mechanism of APDDoS attacks. In the open literature, extensive research has focused on this area. Haldar et al. [11] first proposed the differential dynamics model of an APDDoS attack based on a computer virus propagation model. Hou and Wang [12] proposed an APDDoS attack model with a saturated contact infection rate. Zhang and Xiao [13] studied the stability of the attacked model based on a differential dynamics representation for APDDoS attacks by considering four types of computer nodes, i.e. weak-defensive nodes, attacked nodes, strongdefensive nodes, and compromised nodes. Based on the mean-field theory, Zhang et al. [14] , [15] developed APDDoS attack models against scale-free networks and arbitrary networks, respectively. Mishra et al. [16] proposed an APDDoS model in an Internet of Things (IoT) environment where they analyzed the conditions in which successful attacks can be launched.
To the best of our knowledge, no study in the literature that focused on analytical defending strategies from APDDoS attacks. The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new dynamic APDDoS attack model with a Reverse-Path Forwarding (RPF)-based defending strategy. We prove the stability of the proposed model and show the effectiveness of the proposed defending strategy by analyzing the impact of the model's parameter settings on the network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the APDDoS attack model and the proposed defending strategy; Section III presents the mathematical analysis for the proposed method; Section IV analyzes the impact of some parameters on the proposed defending strategy; Section 5 concludes the paper.
II. MODEL OF ADVANCED PERSISTENT DISTRIBUTED DENIAL-OF-SERVICE ATTACK
The schematic of APDDoS is depicted in Figure 1 . The procedures of an APDDoS attack typically consists of two states: spread computer worms and launch flooding attacks. In the stage of spreading computer worms, hackers try to spread computer worms by spreading fake emails or web links. Once a normal computer is infected with a worm, it will be compromised by hackers to become a zombie computer. In the stage of launching flooding attacks, hackers use the compromised zombie computers to launch a flood attack against specific servers.
The APDDoS model considered in this study follows [13] and considers a computer network in which each node represents a computer. The computers can be categorized into four classes: W nodes of weak-defensive computers, A nodes of attacked computers, S nodes of strong-defensive computers (S nodes), and C nodes of compromised computers. W nodes and A nodes are vulnerable to attacks, representing the weak-protected part of the network. S nodes and C nodes possess high defensive levels and are not easy to be attacked. These nodes represent the strong-protected part of the network. We denote W (t), A(t), S(t), and C(t) to represent the proportion of W nodes, A nodes, S nodes, and C nodes in the whole network at time t, respectively, and W (t)+A(t)+S(t)+
It is assumed that a weak-defensive computer has the probability of β to be infected. The infection could be caused by certain operations (e.g. browsing deceptive websites). An attacked computer has a γ probability of recovering from being attacked due to certain corrective actions (e.g. re-installation of the operating system). A strongdefensive computer can be self-protected by a firewall with a protection level p and has the probability of α/p to become a compromised computer. A compromised computer has the probability of η to recover and become a strong-defensive computer.
By denoting φ and 1-φ as the proportion of the weak part and strong part of the network, respectively, the two groups can be determined as: φ ≡ W (t)+A(t) and 1-φ ≡ S(t)+C(t).
Based on above modelling principles, the evolution process of the ratio of the four computer classes in a computer network can be expressed as a set of differential equations (Eq. (1)), which represent the APDDoS attack model:
The are several kinds of techniques that can be used for defending APPDoS attacks, including reverse-path forwarding, Blackholing and sinkhole, DDS based defense, IPS based prevention, and Upstream filtering [17] . Among these, RPF has been proved to be an effective technique that can block packets sent by specific IP addresses and prevent server hosts from being attacked by particular IP addresses [18] , [19] . The basic principle of using RPF against APPDDoS attacks is illustrated in Figure 2 . When a server receives a message, it extracts the source address of the message. The server then checks if the source address is in the routing table recorded in the server. If this is the case, the server forwards the message, otherwise, it simply discards the message. In this way, malicious attacks from certain source addresses can be blocked.
By applying RPF for defending purposes, some attacked computers with a low defensive level will lose their capabilities of attacking the server. We use D to denote the number of this new class of computers, i.e. attacked computers disabled by RPF. We also use D(t) to denote the proportion of these computers in the network. Obviously, W (t) + A(t) + S(t) + C(t) + D(t) ≡1 and the transition diagram of the five classes of computers can be depicted in Figure 3 .
It is assumed that an attacked computer has the probability of ε to become a computer disabled by RPF. A computer disabled by RPF has the probability of τ to recover due to the adoption of certain corrective actions (e.g. re-install the operation system). With the introduction of the fifth computer class, following expressions are apply: φ ≡ W (t)+A(t)+D(t) and 1-φ ≡ S(t) + C(t).
The dynamic APDDoS attack model with the RPF-based defensive strategy can be re-written as:
where 0 ≤ W (t),
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF APDDOS ATTACK WITH RPF-BASED DEFENDING STRATEGY
This section provides the theoretical analysis for the proposed APDDoS attack model's equilibrium, attack threshold, and the system (represented by system (2))'s stability.
. Therefore, the third and fourth equations in system (2) can be represented by the other three equations:
Since the system (2) and system (3) are equivalent, the rest of this paper will focus on analyzing system (3).
A. THE SYSTEM'S EQUILIBRIA
An equilibrium in the proposed model represents a possible final state of the APDDoS attack and defense.
Theorem 3.1: When there is no attack, there is a unique equilibrium E 0 = (W 0 ,A 0 ,C 0 ) T = (φ,0,0) T in system (3). Proof:Considering the following system
Obviously, W 0 = φ, A 0 =0, and C 0 =0 is the solution of system (4) . Hence E 0 is always an attack-free equilibrium of system (3).
Theorem 3.2: The equilibrium of the system (3) with attacks is calculated as:
a. If βη − ατ = 0, = a 2 1 − 4a 0 a 2 > 0 and
Proof: Let E 1 = (W 1 , A 1 , C 1 ) T be an attacked equilibrium of system (3). By solving system (4), we can obtain
the root of the following equation:
, and a 2 = −ηετ (1 − φ), then the following cases apply:
(i) Since a 2 <0, then if βη − ατ > 0, = a 2 1 − 4a 0 a 2 > 0, and (5) can be rewritten as:
Obviously, equation (6) at least has a positive real root
The proof is complete. It can be seen from Theorem 3.2 that an APDDoS attack may have two final persistent states, i.e. E 1 and E 2 .
B. ATTACKED THRESHOLD AND STABILITY
The attacked threshold is a vital parameter that determines whether the system will be attacked by APDDoS attacks. In this study, we use the FV method presented in [13] to calculate the attacked threshold of the proposed APDDoS model. Let x = (A (t) , C (t)) T , then following functions can be defined as:
The sufficient condition of the existence of an attacked threshold in the proposed APDDoS (denoted as R 0 ) model is that W 0 = φ, A 0 =0, C 0 = 0 in Eqs. (7) and (8) . By taking the partial derivative of A and C, there are:
By calculation, we obtain
Finally, the two maximum eigenvalues of FV −1 are calculated as ρ FV −1 = 0 and ρ FV −1 = βφ ε(1−φ) , while the zero maximum eigenvalues is discarded.
Based on this, the attacked threshold is calculated as:
We perform theoretical analyses to understand the dynamic behavior of the proposed APDDoS attack model with RPF based defending strategy. This is achieved by studying the stability of the three equilibria of system (3). The attack would tend to die out or be persist depending on whether the attackfree equilibrium or the attacked equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
Theorem 3.3: E 0 is locally asymptotically stable if R 0 <1. Proof : For system (3) , the Jacobian matrix at E 0 is:
The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix can be deduced as:
Eq. (12) has two roots:λ 1 = −τ < 0 and
Theorem 3.3 shows that the APDDoS attack would finally die out if R 0 <1. We use the following example to illustrate Theorem 3.3.
Consider an instance of system (3) with following settings: α =0.03, η =0.04, β =0.08, τ =0.02, ε =0.3, φ =0.5, E 0 =(0.5,0,0) T , and R 0 = 0.2667 <1. The system is locally asymptotically stable at E 0 (Figure 4) .
The locally asymptotically stability of E 1 and E 2 are represented by the following two theorems.
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Proof: For system (3), the Jacobian matrix at E 1 is
The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix is:
where Based on the Hurwitz criterion [20] , when b 3 ) > 0, the two roots of Eq. (16) have negative real parts. Hence, E 1 is locally asymptotically stable. The following example is used to illustrate theorem 3.4.
Consider an instance of system (3) with α = 0.2, η = 0.17, β = 0.37,τ = 0.19,ε = 0.12,and φ = 0.5. Since βη − ατ = 0, and the parameters satisfy Theorem 3.4, the system is locally asymptotically stable at E 1 = (0.12, 0.3, 0.13) T (Figure 5) .
Proof: The proof of Theorem 3.5 is the same as the proof in Theorem 3.4. Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 indicate that the APDDoS attack would be persist if the conditions in the theorems are satisfied. Consider an instance of system (3) with α = 0.6, η = 0.4, β = 0.6, τ = 0.4,ε = 0.12, and φ = 0.5. Since βη − ατ = 0 and the parameters satisfy Theorem 3.5, the system is locally asymptotically stable at E 2 = (0.06, 0.4, 0.19) T (Figure 6 ).
IV. PARAMETER IMPACT ANALYSIS
This section investigates the impact of the proposed APDDoS model's parameters on the system's behaviors.
Based on Theorems 3.1 and 3.3, in order to mitigate an APDDoS attack, some actions need to be taken so that R 0 <1.
Since R 0 = βφ ε(1−φ) , after simple calculations it can be obtained:
Obviously, R 0 is strictly increasing for growing numbers of the parameters β and φ (Figures 7 and 8) and is strictly decreasing with increasing ε (Figure 9) .
Based on the presented results, some useful suggestions on mitigating APDDoS attacks are drawn as: 1) minimize the value for β by installing defensive software in the weak-protected part of the network and keeping the software updated; 2) increase the value of the defensive rate ε by adopting the RPF defensive strategy; 3) reduce the proportion of the weak-protected part of the network (φ) and increase the proportion of strong-protected part (1-φ).
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a new APDDoS attack model with a defensive strategy based on reverse-path forwarding.
We perform analytical analysis to show that the attack model has three equilibria, i.e. an attack-free equilibrium E 0 , and two attacked equilibria E 1 and E 2 . The analysis results also show the attacked threshold R 0 is a critical parameter to determine whether the attack would be successful or not. Some actions are recommended to mitigate against the occurrence of APDDoS attacks.
